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AUDREY J. SAMIT 
RICHARD U. STUBBS, JR.* 
INTRODUCTION 
More and more employees who believe that they have been 
wronged in the workplace are aware of their legal options. As a 
result, employees are bringing an ever-increasing number and wider 
variety of administrative and civil claims against their employers. 
Many employers now facing the prospect of such liability question 
the extent to which their workers' compensation and generalliabil­
ity insurance will shield them from exposure. Even employers that 
are experienced in defending employee claims are uncertain 
whether insurance will cover newer, more novel claims. 
This Article is intended to provide practitioners and employers 
with a general overview of insurance coverage for employment-re­
lated claims under Massachusetts law. It also sets forth issues that 
employers should consider when they receive such a claim. Section 
I discusses Massachusetts Workers' Compensation law, which is the 
first place an employer should look for coverage upon receiving an 
employee's claim. Because not all claims are covered under work­
ers' compensation insurance, the remaining sections discuss general 
liability insurance that may protect employers from claims. Specifi­
cally, Section II discusses a general liability insurance company's 
duty to defend an employer against employee claims. Section III 
discusses both public policy and general insurance practices that ex­
clude certain claims from coverage. The Article concludes that 
Massachusetts law on insurance coverage of employment disputes is 
developing slowly and suggests that employers should consider al­
* Richard U. Stubbs, Jr. and Marylou Fabbo practice labor and employment law 
at the law firm of Skoler, Abbot & Presser, P.e. Audrey Samit, a Boston University 
School of Law graduate, is a labor and employment law attorney. 
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ternative insurance coverage to protect against claims arising out of 
the employment relationship. 
1. COVERAGE FOR EMPLOYMENT CLAIMS UNDER 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
Most employment-related claims fall within the scope of the 
Workers' Compensation Act (the "Act").! The broad language of 
the Act allows employees to receive compensation from the work­
ers' compensation insurer or self-insured employer? without prov­
ing that the employer was negligent, if the employee suffers a 
"personal injury"3 arising out of and in the course of employment.4 
Thus, the Workers' Compensation Act is an employee's exclusive 
remedy against the employer for actions based on negligence,5 
1. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 152, §§ 1-86 (1994). 
2. For detailed information about an employer's duty to obtain workers' compen­
sation insurance and related matters, see 29 LAURENCE S. LoCKE, MASSACHUSETfS 
PRACTICE, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (2d ed. 1981). 
3. The Workers' Compensation Act defines personal injury as follows: 
"Personal injury" includes infectious or contagious diseases if the nature of the 
employment is such that the hazard of contracting such diseases by an em­
ployee is inherent in the employment. "Personal injury" shall not include any 
injury resulting from an employee's purely voluntary participation in any rec­
reational activity, including but not limited to athletic events, parties, and pic­
nics, even though the employer pays some or ali of the cost thereof. Personal 
injuries shall include mental or emotional disabilities only where the predomi­
nant contributing cause of such disability is an event or series of events occur­
ring within any employment. ... No mental or emotional disability arising 
principally out of a bona fide, personnel action including a transfer, promo­
tion, demotion, or termination except such action which is the intentional in­
fliction of emotional harm shall be deemed to be a personal injury within the 
meaning of this chapter. 
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 152, § 1(7A) (1994). 
4. Ch. 152, § 26. There are, however, two general exceptions to this rule; First, 
an employee may bring a common-law action arising out of personal injury in the work­
place against an employer if the employee, at the time of hire, gave written notice to the 
employer stating that the employee was reserving all common-law rights of action. 
§ 24. Second, an employee may sue an employer in tort if the employer fails to obtain 
proper workers' compensation coverage. §§ 66-67. See, e.g., Thorson v. Mandell, 402 
Mass. 744,525 N.E.2d 375 (1988). In such a case, an employee also may sue the corpo­
rate officers who negligently failed to provide workers' compensation coverage. 
LaClair v. Silberline Mfg. Co., 379 Mass. 21, 393 N.E.2d 867 (1979). 
In addition to barring civil actions against employers, the Act also bars an em­
ployee from suing a co-employee for personal injuries caused by the co-employee in the 
course of and within the scope of the co-employee's employment. See, e.g., Mendes v. 
Tin Kee Ng, 400 Mass. 131, 132, 507 N.E.2d 1048, 1050 (1987). 
5. See, e.g., Bagley's Case, 256 Mass. 593, 152 N.E. 882 (1926). 
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products liability,6 and intentional torts.? Certain torts, however, 
are not "personal injuries" within the meaning of the Act and may 
subject an employer to civil liability. For example, non-physical 
torts such as defamation,S malicious prosecution,9 false imprison­
ment,lO and slanderll are not "personal injuries" within the mean­
ing of the Workers' Compensation Act. These torts do not 
constitute "personal injuries" because they are intended to protect 
against harm other than injury to an employee's mind or body,12 
Violation of an employee's civil rights is also not a personal injury 
arising out of and in the course of employment,13 
In addition, psychological illness has long been recognized as a 
compensable personal injury under the Workers' Compensation 
ACt.14 . According to the statutory language, emotional injuries that 
result from bona fide personnel actions, with the exception of inju­
ries arising from the intentional infliction of emotional distress,15 
6. See, e.g., Rizzuto v. Joy Mfg. Co., 834 F.2d 7, 9 (1st Cir. 1987); Longever v. 
Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 381 Mass. 221, 224, 408 N.E.2d 857, 859 (1980). 
7. See, e.g., Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 381 Mass. 545, 550, 413 N.E.2d 711, 715 
(1980) (holding that the Workers' Compensation Act is the exclusive remedy for inten­
tional infliction of emotional distress), appeal after remand, 400 Mass. 82, 508 N.W.2d 
72 (1987). However, damages for emotional distress suffered by an employee as the 
result of sexual harassment are not precluded by the Workers' Compensation Act. See, 
e.g., College-Town, Div. of Interco, Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimina­
tion, 400 Mass. 156,508 N.E.2d 587 (1987); Franklin Publishing Co., Inc. v. Massachu­
setts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 974, 519 N.E.2d 798 (1988). 
Although the Act provides the exclusive remedy for intentional torts, the amount 
of compensation payable to the employee is doubled when the employee's injury results 
from the employer's "serious and willful misconduct." MASS. GEN. L. ch. 152, § 28 
(1994). See, e.g., Armstrong's Case, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 147,472 N.E.2d 669 (1984). 
8. See, e.g., Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 381 Mass. 545, 413 N.E.2d 711 (1980). 
9. See, e.g., ill. 
10. See, e.g., Zygmuntowicz v. American Steel & Wire Co., 240 Mass. 421, 134 
N.E. 385 (1922). 
11. See, e.g., Ezekiel v. Jones Motor Co., 374 Mass. 382, 372 N.E.2d 1281 (1978). 
12. Milner v. Stepan Chern. Co., 599 F. Supp. 358, 360 (D. Mass 1984). 
13. See, e.g., O'Connell v. Chasdi, 400 Mass. 686,511 N.E.2d 349 (1987). 
14. See, e.g., Ann Marie Robinson's Case, 416 Mass. 454,623 N.E.2d 478 (1993); 
Kelly's Case, 394 Mass. 684,477 N.E.2d 582 (1985). 
15. There are four elements to a cause of action for intentional infliction of emo­
tional distress: (1) the defendant intended to inflict emotional distress or knew or 
should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his or her conduct; 
(2) the conduct at issue was "extreme and outrageous" and "beyond all possible bounds 
of decency" and was "utterly intolerable in a civilized community"; (3) the defendant's 
actions caused the plaintiff's distress; and (4) the plaintiffs distress was "severe" and of 
a nature that "no reasonable man could be expected to endure it." Agis v. Howard 
Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 144-45, 355 N.E.2d 315, 318-19 (1976). 
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are excluded from the Act's coverage.16 Nonetheless, it appears 
that actions alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress based 
on bona fide personnel actions may be preempted by the Act; how­
ever, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (the "SJC") has 
not decided the issue.17 
Employers should also be aware that many general liability 
policies exclude coverage for injuries that fall within the Act. In 
Hanover Insurance Co. v. Ramsey,1S the SJC concluded that such a 
general liability policy exclusion barred coverage of an employee's 
injuries because the employee was eligible for workers' compensa­
tion coverage,I9 but the employer had failed to maintain proper 
workers' compensation insurance.2o Thus, an employer who fails to 
16. 	 The relevant statutory definition of "personal injury" contains the following 
conditions and exclusions: 
Personal injuries shall include mental or emotional disabilities only where the 
predominant contributing cause of such disability is an event or series of 
events occurring within any employment .... No mental or emotional disabil­
ity arising principally out of a bona fide personnel action including a transfer, 
promotion, demotion or termination except such action which is the inten­
tional infliction of emotional harm shall be deemed to be a personal injury 
within the meaning of this chapter. 
MASS. 	GEN. L. ch. 152, § 1(7A) (1994). 
The bona fide personnel action exclusion was added by the legislature in response 
to the Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Kelly's Case, 394 Mass. at 689, 477 N.E.2d at 
585. In Kelly's Case, the court expanded compensability to psychological injuries result­
ing from a transfer from one department to another. Id. Chief Justice Hennessey writ­
ing for the dissent, however, noted that the stress causing emotional injury in Kelly's 
Case was the type that arises" 'from the common necessity of working for a living'" and 
should not, therefore, be compensable. Id. at 692, 477 N.E.2d at 587 (Hennessey, C.J. 
dissenting) (quoting Korsun's Case, 354 Mass. 124, 128,235 N.E.2d 814, 816 (1968». 
17. Several courts have held that the Act's exclusivity provision bars claims for 
negligent i~fliction of emotional distress. See, e.g., Clarke v. Kentucky Fried Chicken, 
57 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 1995); Catalano v. First Essex Savings Bank, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 
639 N.E.2d 1113 (1994). The Appellate Division of the Massachusetts Superior Court, 
however, has held that an employee may bring a common-law complaint against an 
employer alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress arising out of employment 
because such claim is not barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compen­
sation Act. Seeley v. Prime Computer, Inc., 1990 Mass. App. Div. 132, 136 (1990). 
18. 	 405 Mass. 1101,539 N.E.2d 537 (1989). 
19. Id. at 1102, 539 N.E.2d at 537 (the exclusion barred coverage for "any em­
ployee of the insured who is entitled to·payments or benefits under the provisions of the 
Massachusetts Workers' Compensation Act ...."). Id. 
20. The Hanover employee was injured in an automobile owned and operated by 
his employer during the course and scope of his employment. The employer, however, 
failed to maintain workers' compensation insurance; therefore, the employee sued the 
employer in state court. After winning the action, the employer attempted to collect 
from the employer's automobile insurance carrier. The court, however, concluded that 
the employer, who had failed to fulfill his obligation under the Act, was not entitled to 
indemnification by his automobile insurance carrier. Id. at 1102, 539 N.E.2d at 538. 
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obtain the proper workers' compensation coverage may also be de­
nied coverage under its general liability policy.21 
II. AN INSURER'S DuTY TO DEFEND 
At the initial stages of litigation and long before the court or a 
jury determines liability, insured employers often become con­
cerned with the high costs of defending legal actions brought 
against them. Depending on the nature of the allegedly improper 
actions and the complexity of the lawsuit, defense costs could be as 
high or higher than the final award of damages. Thus, to an insured 
employer, the insurer's duty to defend is often as important, if not 
more important, than the insurer's duty to indemnify.22 
The insurer's duty to provide a defense is defined by the terms 
of the insurance policy. Accordingly, if the insurance policy has no 
provision requiring an insurer to defend the insured, the insurer has 
no duty to defend.23 The typical duty-to-defend provision in a gen­
eral liability policy requires that an insurer: "shall have the right 
and duty to defend any suit against the insured seeking damages on 
account of such personal injury even if any of the allegations of the 
suit are groundless, false or fraudulent. "24 Most insurance policies 
have similar language.25 
Under Massachusetts law, the duty to defend is construed 
21. In addition, an employer who fails to maintain proper workers' compensation 
coverage for its employees is subject to criminal prosecution, a stop work order, and 
may be barred from contracting with the Commonwealth or any of its political subdivi­
sions. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 152, § 25C (1994). An injured employee, however, may file a 
claim for compensation against the Workers' Compensation Special Fund, in addition 
to filing a suit for tort damages against an employer. Ch. 152, § 65. 
22. For a detailed discussion of the duty to indemnify, see Nicholas P. Alexander, 
Developments in Indemnity Law: Express, Implied Contractua~ Ton-Based and Statu­
tory, 79 MASS. L. REv. 50 (1994). 
23. In general, Massachusetts courts construe ambiguous language in an insur­
ance policy against the insurer. Liquor Liability Joint Underwriting Ass'n of Mass. v. 
Hermitage Ins. Co., 419 Mass. 316, 644 N.E.2d 964 (1995); Pinheiro v. The Medical 
Malpractice Joint Underwriting Ass'n of Mass., 406 Mass. 288,547 N.E.2d 49 (1989); 
Biathrow v. Continental Casualty Co., 371 Mass. 249, 356 N.E.2d 451 (1976). There­
fore, if the existence of a duty to defend is questionable, a Massachusetts court likely 
would conclude that it exists. 
24. See Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 406 
Mass. 7, 10 n.3, 545 N.E.2d 1156, 1157-58 n.3 (1989). 
25. Some duty-to-defend clauses set forth specific exclusions from an insurer's 
duty to defend. See, e.g., Lumberman's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 38 
Mass. App. Ct. 53, 55, 645 N.E.2d 35, 36 (1995) ("We have the right and duty to defend 
any suit asking for these damages. However, we have no duty to defend suits for bodily 
injury or property damage ...."). 
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broadly26 and is triggered by the allegations in the complaint.27 If 
those allegations are reasonably susceptible of falling within the pol­
icy's coverage, the insurer must defend the action.28 Further, if the 
complaint is ambiguous as to whether the duty to defend is trig­
gered, the insurer is required to defend the action. 
To determine whether the duty to defend has been triggered, 
Massachusetts courts look to the conduct and injury alleged in the 
complaint. The plaintiff's description of the cause of action is unim­
portant.29 For example, in Boston Symphony Orchestra v. Commer­
cial Union,3o the plaintiff alleged breach of contract against the 
insured. The factual basis for the breach of contract claim was an 
allegation that the defendant's alleged breach of an employment 
contract led to the plaintiff's inability to find work elsewhere.31 The 
insurance company argued that the plaintiff had alleged breach of 
contract, which was excluded from policy coverage. However, the 
court stated that the allegations were "fairly susceptible" to a defa­
mation claim, which the policy did cover.32 In reaching that conclu­
sion, the court set forth the test for determining whether the 
complaint triggers a duty to defend. According to the court, "[t]he 
process is not one of looking at the legal theory enunciated by the 
pleader but of 'envisaging what kinds of losses may be proved as 
lying within the range of the allegations of the complaint, and then 
seeing whether any such loss fits the expectation of protective insur­
ance reasonably generated by the terms of the policy."'33 Accord­
ingly, a cause of action that involves conduct covered by the policy, 
such as defamation, does not absolve the insurer of its duty to de­
fend simply because the complaint calls the cause of action some­
thing that is not covered by the policy. 
Massachusetts courts have also suggested that the duty to de­
26. See Boston Symphony Orchestra, 406 Mass. at 10,545 N.E.2d at 1158. 
27. See Mingo Corp. v. Essex Ins. Co., 1995 Mass. App. Div. 66 ("[A] legal duty 
to defend ... exists if the allegations of the complaint ... against the insured are 
reasonably susceptible of an interpretation that they state or adumbrate a claim covered 
by the policy terms.") (citing Sterilite Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 17 Mass. App. 
Ct. 316, 318, 458 N.E.2d 338, 340 (1983». 
28. See Vappi & Co., Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 348 Mass. 427, 430, 204 
N.E.2d 273,275 (1965); SteriliteCorp., 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 318, 458 N.E.2d at 340. 
29. See Mingo Corp., 1995 Mass. App. Div. at 68 (stating that the appropriate 
focus in making such a determination is the "factual core" of the complaint). 
30. 406 Mass. 7, 545 N.E.2d 1156 (1989). 
31. Id. at 11, 545 N.E.2d at 1.158. 
32. Id. at 11-13, 545 N.E.2d at 1158-59. 
33. Id. at 11-12, 545 N.E.2d at 1159 (quoting Sterilite Corp. v. Continental Casu­
alty Co., 17 Mass. App. Ct. 316, 318, 458 N.E.2d 338, 341 (1983». 
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fend may be triggered by facts that were not contained in the origi­
nal complaint. For example, in Terrio v. McDonough ,34 the plaintiff 
alleged that the defendant/insured intentionally pushed her down a 
flight of stairs. The defendant's insurance policy excluded coverage 
for intentional acts. Consequently, the defendant's insurer refused 
to defend the action.35 The defendant denied that he intentionally 
pushed plaintiff down the stairs and claimed that any responsibility 
for her fall was due to his negligence. The defendant filed a third 
party complaint on the ground that negligent acts were within the 
policy's coverage. However, plaintiff's attorney waived plaintiff's 
right to amend her complaint to include a claim for negligence. As 
a result, the court concluded that the insurer had no duty to defend 
the action as the complaint did not, and would not in the future, 
implicate coverage.36 In dicta, however, the court noted that if the 
plaintiff had not unambiguously waived her right to bring a negli­
gence action against the defendant, its conclusion might have been 
different. For example, according to the court, had the plaintiff's 
theory of liability changed during the trial and an amendment to 
the complaint been allowed, the insurer might have been bound to 
indemnify the insured and pay his defense costS.37 
Once a duty to defend has been established, the general rule is 
that the duty extends to the entire lawsuit. On two occasions, the 
SJC has suggested that this rule holds in Massachusetts as well, so 
that once an insurer's duty to defend is triggered, the insurer is obli­
gated to pay the reasonable costs of defending the entire action and 
not just the causes of action that the policy may cover.38 
34. 16 Mass. App. a. 163, 165, 450 N.E.2d 190, 192 (1983). 
35. Id. at 166,450 N.E.2d at 193. For a general discussion of damages recoverable 
for a breach of the duty to defend, see Lynn Haggerty King & Heidi Loken Benas, The 
Duty to Defend: When Does It Exist and What Damages Are Recoverable for Its 
Breach, 7 U.S.F. MAR. L.I. 245 (1994). 
36. Terrio, 16 Mass. App. a. at 167,450 N.E.2d at 193. 
37. Id. at 168-69,450 N.E.2d at 194; see also Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. 
Belleville Indus., Inc., 407 Mass. 675, 686, 555 N.E.2d 568, 575 (1990); Desrosiers v. 
Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 393 Mass. 37, 40, 468 N.E.2d 625, 627-28 (1984); Peerless Ins. Co. 
v. Hartford Ins. Co., 34 Mass. App. a. 534, 536, 613 N.E.2d 125, 127 (1993). To the 
contrary, in at least one case the SIC concluded that an unpleaded allegation relieved 
the insurer of its duty to defend. See Desrosiers, 393 Mass. at 40, 468 N.E.2d at 627-28 
(concluding that an insurer did not have a duty to defend an action where the complaint 
did not allege that the named insured or any of its employees was involved in the inci­
dent resulting in plaintiffs' injuries). 
38. See Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Nonaka, 414 Mass. 187, 191,606 N.E.2d 
904,907 (1993) ("Because there were negligence counts in each successive complaint, it 
was reasonable for Merrimack to conclude that it had a duty to defend all aspects of the 
case."); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 413 Mass. 730, 732 n.l, 
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An insurer's obligation to pay defense costs arises when the 
duty to defend is triggered, as long as the insured has notified the 
insurer of the lawsuit implicating coverage. If the insured fails to 
notify the insurer of the original complaint, even though that com­
plaint triggered coverage,39 or if the complaint is later amended in a 
manner that triggers coverage, the insured cannot recover its de­
fense costs back to the initiation of the lawsuit.40 
Once an insurer begins to defend or "takes control" of a law­
suit against an insured it cannot thereafter claim that the policy 
does not cover the liability claimed.41 In order to retain the ability 
to ultimately deny coverage, an insurer may enter into a "reserva­
tion of rights" or "non-waiver" agreement with the insured.42 How­
ever, if the insurer does so, it must give the insured the option of 
taking over control of the defense.43 Thus, if an insurer attempts to 
enter into a reservation of rights or non-waiver agreement with the 
insured but insists upon retaining control of the defense, such reser­
vation of rights or non-waiver agreement would be ineffective.44 If, 
however, the insured takes over control of the defense, the insurer 
may be liable for the insured's defense costs if the policy covers the 
claim.45 
In summary, the language of the insurance policy and the com­
plaint determine whether an insurer has a duty to defend an action 
brought against an employer. Prior to purchasing an insurance pol­
icy that provides coverage for employment-related disputes, an em­
ployer should give careful attention to the policy language to ensure 
that it contains provisions that require the insurer to defend law­
suits, administrative actions, and other proceedings brought against 
the employer. Although the language of the complaint generally is 
within the control of the plaintiff, the employer could, through ap­
604 N.E.2d 30, 32 n.1 (1992) (stating that the weight of authority required an insurer 
who had a duty to defend one count to defend the entire complaint). 
39. Augat, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 117, 123, 571 N.E.2d 357, 361 
(1991) (holding insurer not liable for environmental clean-up costs that the insured vol­
untarily assumed as the result of lawsuit brought by the state). 
40. Hoppy's Oil Serv., Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 783 F. Supp. 1505 (D. 
Mass. 1992). 
41. Lunt v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 261 Mass. 469, 472-73, 159 N.E. 461, 463 (1928). 
42. See Liddell v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 283 Mass. 340,343-44, 187 N.E. 39, 
41 (1933). 
43. Salonen v. Paanenen, 320 Mass. 568, 574, 71 N.E.2d 227, 231 (1947). 
44. Id. at 574, 71 N.E.2d at 232; Three Sons, Inc. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 357 Mass. 
271, 277, 257 N.E.2d 774, 777 (1970). 
45. Magoun v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 346 Mass. 677, 685, 195 N.E.2d 514, 519 
(1964). 
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propriate responsive pleadings such as a motion for a more definite 
statement, request the plaintiff to further clarify any allegations that 
may implicate policy coverage. In addition, an employer could de­
pose the plaintiff as soon as practicable to determine whether a 
sketchy complaint actually implicates the insurer's duty to defend. 
Nonetheless, an employer who receives notice of an action against 
it should notify its insurance carrier immediately if there is any pos­
sibility that its insurance policy would require the insured to defend 
the action. Only the employer's prompt notification can protect the 
employer and allow the insurer to determine whether to deny cov­
erage, take control of the defense, or relinquish control pursuant to 
a reservation of rights agreement. 
III. 	 EXTENT OF INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR EMPLOYMENT 
CLAIMS 
An employer's worries do not cease once the insurer assumes 
the employer's defense. The next hurdle is to estimate potential 
liability and determine whether any damages awarded will be cov­
ered by insurance. Public policy prohibits coverage of certain types 
of employment claims, such as intentional discrimination actions. 
An employer's nightmare arises if the court awards punitive dam­
ages, especially since the defendant's net worth is a prime measure 
of the appropriate level of such damages.46 Since punitive damages 
are discretionary, the employer is hard-pressed to assess the prob­
able severity of the award prior to the verdict. Consequently, the 
employer is anxious to know the extent to which its punitive dam­
ages will be covered under its insurance policies. 
Whether punitive damages are entitled to insurance coverage 
turns on two questions. First, is such coverage contrary to public 
policy? Second, if coverage is arguably permissible, are punitive 
damages within the scope of coverage under the employer's insur­
ance policy? 
A. Coverage in Contravention of Public Policy 
Chapter 175, section 47 of the Massachusetts General Laws ex­
pressly provides, inter alia, that no company may insure "against 
legal liability for causing injury other than bodily injury by his de­
46. Paul Holtzman, The Emergence of Punitive Damages in Bias Cases, MASSA­
CHUSETTS LAWYERS WEEKLY, December 12, 1994, § A col. 1 (citing City of Newport v. 
Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 270 (1981». 
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liberate or intentional crime or wrongdoing."47 Of course, almost 
all personnel decisions involve at least some element of employer 
volition. The question is whether the statute's "deliberate or inten­
tional" exclusion bars insurance coverage of all such personnel 
actions. 
In Andover Newton Theological School, Inc. v. Continental 
Casualty CO.,48 the SJC considered whether an act of willful dis­
crimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment AGt 
("ADEA"), if based on a finding of "reckless disregard," consti­
tutes "deliberate or intentional ... wrongdoing" so as to preclude 
indemnification by an insurer under Massachusetts General Laws 
chapter 175, section 47.49 The court relied upon its decision in J. 
D'Amico, Inc. v. Boston,50 where a contractor had cut down certain 
trees without the authorization of the landowner. The court con­
cluded that if the contractor had cut down the trees by mistake, his 
act may not be a deliberate or intentional crime or wrongdoing 
within the meaning of Massachusetts General Laws chapter 175, 
section 47, although his actions may have been willful or reckless.51 
The court held that a finding of willfulness does not necessarily con­
stitute deliberate or intentional wrongdoing.52 The Andover court 
thus distinguished between conduct that was "deliberate or inten­
tional" and conduct that was undertaken with reckless disregard as 
to whether it was lawful. Consequently, willfulness will bar insur­
ance coverage only if an intentionally committed wrongful act was 
also done deliberately or intentionally in the sense that the actor 
knew the act was wrongful. 
The Andover Newton court's distinction between "reckless dis­
regard" and "deliberate or intentional" should alert practitioners to 
give special attention to jury instructions. The Andover Newton 
jury had never been instructed to, and thus did not, decide whether 
the employer had acted with reckless disregard or with full knowl­
edge of the ADEA.53 Similar problems will arise in defamation 
and emotional distress claims. In the event of defamation liability, 
the fact-finder should decide whether the employer or its agent 
published false information about the employee with knowledge, or 
47. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 175, § 47 (1994). 
48. 409 Mass. 350,566 N.E.2d 1117 (1991). 
49. Id. at 351-352, 566 N.E.2d at 1118. 
50. 345 Mass. 218, 186 N.E.2d 716 (1962). 
51. Id. at 225-26, 186 N.E.2d at 721. 
52. Andover Newton, 409 Mass. at 352-53,566 N.E.2d at 118-19. 
53. Id. at 351, 566 N.E.2d at 1118. 
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simply with reckless disregard, of its falsity.54 Counsel should like­
wise consider requiring the fact-finder to decide whether emotional 
distress, if suffered, resulted from reckless55 or intentional56 acts. 
B. 	 Policy Exclusions of Punitive Damages and Other Intentional 
Harms 
The standard Commercial General Liability ("CGL") policy 
limits insurance coverage to acts that are neither "expected" nor 
"intended" by the insured.57 Consequently, the general principle is 
that damages, including punitive damages, awarded because of an 
intentionally caused harm, do not constitute an "accident" or "oc­
currence" and, therefore, are denied coverage. 58 Similarly, both the 
standard automobile insurance and homeowner's policies expressly 
exclude coverage for damage intentionally caused by the insured.59 
In an attempt to define "intentional" or "unexpected," Massa­
chusetts courts have distinguished between "intentional means" 
and "intentional results." The courts have concluded that an inten­
tional act by the insured that causes an unintended injury is an acci­
dent, and thus punitive damages, if awarded, may be coverable by 
an insurance policy. For example, in Quincy Mutual Fire Insurance 
Co. v. Abernathy,60 an insured hurled a piece of black top from a 
bridge. The object hit a car and injured one of the passengers. The 
SJC acknowledged the insured's intent to cause some harm, but 
found that the insured did not intend or expect the extent of harm 
that resulted.61 Therefore, punitive damages were coverable. In a 
somewhat contrary decision, however, the SJC in City ofNewton v. 
Krasnigor62 held that where the insureds set a small fire in a school 
but did not expect or intend the extent of damage that ultimately 
resulted, punitive damages were not within the scope of the policy's 
coverage.63 The SJC reasoned that the actor did not need to intend 
54. 	 See, e.g., Jolin v. Howley, 1992 Mass. App. Div. 51 (1992). 
55. See, e.g., Bowman v. Heller, 420 Mass. 517,651 N.E.2d 369 (1995), cert. de­
nied, No. 95-393, 1995 WL 555488 (Dec 11, 1995). 
56. See, e.g., Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 141,355 N.E.2d 315, 316 
(1976) (recognizing "intentional or reckless infliction of severe emotional distress"). 
57. John D. Boyle & Michael R. O'Malley, Insurance Coverage for Punitive Dam­
ages and Intentional Conduct in Massachusetts, 25 NEW ENG. L. REv. 827 (Spring 1991). 
58. Id.; see also, Rideout v. Crum & Forster Commercial Ins., 417 Mass. 757, 633 
N.E.2d 376 (1994). 
59. 	 Boyle & O'Malley, supra note 57 at 830. 
60. 	 393 Mass. 81, 469 N.E.2d 797 (1984). 
61. 	 Id. at 87-88, 469 N.E.2d at 801-02. 
62. 	 404 Mass. 682, 536 N.E.2d 1078 (1989). 
63. 	 Id. at 688, 536 N.E.2d at 1082. 
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to cause the exact extent of injury for the exclusion provision to 
apply.64 
The SJC took this reasoning one step further in deciding 
Worcester Insurance Co. v. Fells Acres Day School, Inc.65 There, 
the court focused on a day care facility's general liability policy af­
ter several of its employees were convicted of sexually abusing mi­
nors. The general liability policy in question afforded coverage in 
the event of occurrences, including accidents, resulting in bodily in­
jury neither expected nor intended by the insured.66 The non-em­
ployee plaintiffs brought assault and battery claims, yet contended 
such intentional torts might nonetheless constitute occurrences 
under the policy.67 The SJC rejected the argument outright. "[T]he 
nature of [forceful sexual molestation and rape] is such that we 
must conclude, as a matter of law, that the insureds intended to 
cause at least some injury to the tort plaintiffs."68 The court con­
cluded that "intent to injure may be inferred from the commission 
of an inherently injurious act such as forcible sexual abuse"69 and 
that, in fact, "'[r]eason mandates that from the very nature of the 
act, harm to the injured party must have been intended. "'70 The 
court emphasized that the motive of the tortfeasor is not dispositive 
of the intent issue in the context of sexual assault. In other words, 
the court disregarded the defendants' intentions and focused in­
stead on the results. In effect, the court's decision mandated that 
because sexual assault is an intentional act, punitive damages are 
excluded from coverage. . 
Similarly, the SJC in Rideout v. Crum & Forster Commercial 
Insurance 71 concluded that where the defendant was substantially 
certain that the plaintiffs would suffer the types of harm they did in 
fact suffer, the defendant's actions were intentional and thus could 
not be characterized as an "occurrence."72 In Rideout, two sexual 
discrimination plaintiffs had won a $90,000 judgment against their 
former employer for back pay, emotional distress damages, interest, 
and costs. The employer had denied the women promotions and 
64. Id. at 684, 536 N.E.2d at 1080. 
65. 408 Mass. 393, 558 N.E.2d 958 (1990). 
66. Id. at 398 n.6, 558 N.E.2d at 964 n.6. 
67. Id. at 399, 558 N.E.2d at 964. 
68. Id. at 400, 558 N.E.2d at 964. 
69. Id. at 402, 558 N.E.2d at 966. 
70. Id. at 400, 558 N.E.2d at 965 (quoting United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. 
American Employers' Ins. Co., 159 Cal. App. 3d 277, 291 n.9 (1984». 
71. 417 Mass. 757, 633 N.E.2d 376 (1994). 
72. Id. at 764, 633 N.E.2d at 380. 
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overtime because of their sex and retaliated against them for bring­
ing discrimination claims. The plaintiffs appealed the lower court's 
dismissal of their action to reach and apply insurance proceeds. Be­
cause such acts were obviously intentional, they were not covered 
under the terms of the employer's liability insurance, and the SJC 
refused to bring the claims within the ambit of the pOlicy.73 
In trying to reconcile the decisions in Abernathy, Krasnigor, 
and Fells Acres, the court acknowledged in Fells Acres that their 
rulings were based on a consideration of the nature of the acts.74 
The court espoused a litmus test whereby those acts of a "direct and 
forcible nature ... of the inherently injurious kind"75 are deemed 
not coverable. The court cited rape, assault and battery, and sexual 
assault as examples meeting that test.76 
Consider Sanderson v. Wellfleet Fire Department,77 where the 
Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination ("MCAD") 
73. [d. 
74. Fells Acres, 408 Mass. at 400,558 N.E.2d at 963. 
75. [d. at 400, 558 N.E.2d at 965. 
76. But how do these decisions, which clearly concern physical injury, relate to 
situations that do not manifest a bodily injury, such as in a case of sexual harassment or 
wrongful termination with discriminatory animus? In fact, what if a sexual harasser 
commits no bodily touching but rather taunts the employee by words or gestures? 
Would such behavior be coverable? In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Diamant, 401 Mass. 
654,518 N.E.2d 1154 (1988), the court held that "bodily injury" does not include claims 
for emotional distress or mental anguish in the absence of accompanying physical harm. 
[d. at 659,518 N.E.2d at 1157. This case concerned a homeowner's insurance policy, 
which provided coverage only where there was bodily injury. The plaintiff, an algebra 
teacher, had given the Diamants' daughter a failing grade. The Diamants responded by 
sending a letter to the school principal, complaining that the teacher was "psychologi­
cally damaged" and had treated their daughter unfairly. [d. at 655, 518 N.E.2d at 1155. 
The teacher brought an action against the Diamants, alleging defamation and inten­
tional infliction of emotional distress. [d. at 655, 518 N.E.2d at 1155. The defendants 
demanded that its insurance company, Allstate, defend them in this suit. Allstate re­
fused, stating that because there was no bodily injury, the policy did not afford cover­
age. The SJC upheld the insurance company's position. The court emphasized that the 
policy covered only "bodily injury" and distinguished that term from "personal injury." 
"The term 'personal injury' is broader and includes not only physical injury, but also 
any affront or insult to the reputation or sensibilities of a person. 'Bodily injury,' by 
comparison, is a narrow term and encompasses only physical injuries to the body and 
the consequences thereof." [d. at 656, 518 N.E.2d at 1156. 
The court concluded that emotional distress and injury to reputation did not fall 
within the rubric of the "bodily injury" requirement of the Diamants' insurance policy. 
[d. at 659, 518 N.E.2d at 1157. Thus, in the usual case, liability insurance that covers 
"bodily injury" will only cover emotional distress and like claims if they result from 
actual physical harm. [d. at 658, 518 N.E.2d at 1157; see also Fells Acres, 408 Mass. at 
415, 558 N.E.2d at 972 (in broad liability policy, "[c]onsortium injuries are covered, 
however, as 'damages because of bodily injury"'). 
77. 16 MDLR 1341 (1994). 
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awarded damages to the employee whose employer had failed to 
respond seriously to the employee's complaint of sexual harass­
ment. The issue of whether the company's inadequate response 
was or was not coverable under liability insurance did not arise 
here. However, the decisions discussed above indicate that cover­
age depends upon an interpretation of the employer's intent. If the 
employer's attempt to handle the matter was simply sloppy and ir­
responsible, liability insurance would most likely cover the e~­
ployer's damages. If, however, it could be shown that the 
company's attempt was not in good faith but rather deliberately in­
exhaustive and ineffective, then arguably such failure to thoroughly 
investigate a claim of sexual harassment would not be coverable. 
To the extent that a wrongful personnel practice is the result of 
recklessness or negligence, a policy may cover an injury under the 
"occurrence" language.78 "Generally, injuries resulting from reck­
less conduct do not fall into the category of 'expected or intended' 
injuries, but are considered 'accidental' and thus are covered under 
insurance policies."79 Thus, depending on the type of injury cov­
ered, a general liability policy might insure against claims of, among 
others, reckless infliction of emotional distress, negligent hiring, su­
pervision, or retention, negligent infliction of emotional distress, or 
negligent misrepresentation. 
Clearly, employers facing a discrimination suit must carefully 
examine the nature of the discrimination to determine if punitive 
damages would be covered. If the discrimination is characterized 
by a disparate impact theory, then punitive damages may result 
from unintentional actions and thus would probably be covered.80 
If, however, the discriminatory conduct mirrors the facts in Rideout, 
81 and the employee is specifically targeted because of her sex or 
disability, for example, then this conduct may be characterized as 
deliberate and intentional and therefore may be excludable from 
coverage either by the insurance policy's own terms or pursuant to 
Massachusetts General Laws chapter 175, section 47. 
Again, ascertaining coverage in the realm of sexual harassment 
is more problematic. The Fells Acres decision suggests that sexual 
78. See, e.g., Fells Acres, 408 Mass. at 410-11, 558 N.E.2d at 972. 
79. Id. at 411, 558 N.E.2d at 970. 
80. See Save Mart Supermarkets v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 843 F. Supp. 
597 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (where the court held, inter alia, that disparate impact claims are 
not precluded from coverage). 
81. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of Rideout v. 
Crum & Forster Commercial Ins., 417 Mass. 757,633 N.E.2d 376 (1994). 
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assault is intentional and deliberate and thus punitive damages 
would not be covered by the insurer. Whether coverage exists 
where a male employee makes rude and suggestive gestures to a 
female co-worker is not so easily determined. As discussed above, 
it appears that coverage would depend upon whether the terms of 
the insurance policy covered bodily injury or personal injury and 
whether coverage was prohibited under Massachusetts General 
Laws chapter 175, section 47. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Massachusetts, like many other jurisdictions, does not have a 
plethora of case law concerning insurance coverage for employment 
disputes. With this in mind, employers should be aware of general 
coverage disputes that might arise and consider how they can pro­
tect themselves. First, employers must realize that not all types of 
claims are covered by their insurance policies. Rather than rely 
upon general liability policies, an employer seeking insurance cov­
erage for employment-related practices liability should secure such 
coverage in the surplus lines market. 
In addition, employers should be aware that not all claims give 
rise to a duty to defend on the part of the insurer. Given the high 
cost of litigation in employment disputes, this can be an important 
issue for employers. Further, employers must know that even if an 
insured does have a duty to defend in a particular case, certain ele­
ments of damages for the claim may not be recoverable under the 
employer's policies. Until Massachusetts develops more precedent 
that clearly defines the relative rights of the employer and the in­
sured, employers must take note of these issues and act accordingly. 

